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Paper Abstract: Intelligence Community Threat and Environment Characterization

While there has been a wholesale adoption of "commercial, off-the-shelf" technologies for Intelligence Community (IC) networking infrastructure, and in particular of the technologies of the Internet, the nature of that infrastructure does differ, in some cases markedly, from more readily-observable Internet-oriented networks and systems.

IC networks include self-contained, secure networks within organizations; inter-organizational systems within a closed community; and networks bridged to outside communities, both for classified communication (e.g., within international coalitions) and for exchange (sometimes one-way only) with the Internet.

As a general observation distance from the "open Internet" should reduce the proportion of extraneous noise, whether through imposition of strong perimeter checks, one-way exchange points, or isolated networks with no Internet connectivity at all. This distance, accompanied with atypical blends of applications and operating systems, alters the operating environment for sensors and correlators.

This document is intended to be an overview of general and specific IC environments and how they differs from the Internet, as well as a collection of open-source resources available for further study. The Open Source Information System (OSIS) and Secret Protocol Internet Router Network (SIPRNET) have been chosen for further examination and later simulation.

A survey instrument will be used to gain additional insight into specific IC environments; it is attached in Appendix B for comment and (optionally) for distribution to principal investigators.

(This document was compiled by Skaion Corporation from unclassified open sources as part of ARDA contract NBCHC030117 for the IAIC and P2INGS programs. It is considered For Official Use Only, and available upon request to federal agencies and their contractors.)