Ongoing DARPA-sponsored research in computer intrusion detection (ID)
has produced emerging systems that exploit a variety of techniques such
as network sniffing, filesystem checks and local host audit record
inspection, or more complex correlations of distributed sensors’ various
reports. This research has become increasingly important as computer
attacks increase in number, publicity and damage done. The Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL) INFOSEC Technology Office has volunteered
to regularly test and evaluate these emerging ID systems for possible
insertion into critical national networks.
The evaluations included running the ID systems in a live network and
then flooding that network with a variety of traffic, both “normal”
(legitimate traffic that any office network would reasonably expect to
occur, such as email, HTTP, telnet, etc.) and attacks, including fairly
recent and more well-known network attacks. For the sake of the
testbed’s real security and the integrity of the evaluations, AFRL built a
self-contained test environment to model an actual base network.
Supporting the AFRL test effort, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory developed non-real-time evaluation tools
for assessing the performance of individual ID systems. Their testbed,
designed for repeatability, dramatically accelerated playing back huge
volumes of data to quickly produce high-confidence performance
measurements. However, ID systems in the field will likely have to defend
larger and more complex networks and will interact with other
components. This interaction and the resulting performance required
AFRL’s building a more complex, real-time environment.
Air Force Intrusion Detection System Evaluation Environment (667K PDF)